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Abstract
This paper analyzes and compares arbitrator behaviorunder conventional
and final—offer arbitration. Simple models of arbitratorbehavior are
developed under each of these alternative mechanisms. Thesemodels are
estimated and tested using data on the outcomes of both formsof arbitration
in New Jersey, a state in which arbitration ismandatory for unresolved pay
disputes involving police officer unions and publicemployers. The major
findings are (1) that the high proportion of union victories underfinal—offer
arbitration were generated by a set of impartial arbitratorsapplying the same
standards used in conventional arbitration, and (2) thatunion bargainers appear
to be considerably more risk averse than employerbargainers, with the wage
increases under final—offer arbitration havinga lower mean and a lower variance
than under conventional arbitration.
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(609) 452—4041 (617) 495—4690The arbitration of disputes by third—party neutrals has become
a major industry in the U.S. Arbitration's use in the settlement of
disputes arising under existing contracts ranges from the settlement
of grievances in union—management contracts to the settlement of
highly complex disputes between buyers and sellers in commercial
contracts. Arbitration is also now widely used to arrive at the terms
of new contracts. The use of these provisions for contract, or
'interest," arbitration ranges from the highly public disputes between
baseball players and club owners to the settlement of public sector
labor disputes and the fashioning of divorce settlements.
Since arbitration mechanisms may be designed in severalways,
their increased use makes it increasingly important to understand how
the differences in arbitration systems may affect outcomes. Ourpur-
pose in this paper is to open up the empirical analysis of some simple
models of arbitrator behavior under alternative mechanisms and in dif-
ferent economic environments. We do this by studying the outcomes in
the first three years of operation of a New Jersey statute thatman-
dates the arbitration of unsettled pay disputes by New Jersey police
officers and the municipalities that employ them. This remarkable
statute provides for conventional arbitration of pay disputes If the
two parties can agree to this, but requires the use of final—offer
arbitration if they cannot. Consequently, the results of both mecha-
nisms may be analyzed and compared.—2—
In proceeding this way we hope to shed light on two related
issues. First, arbitration mechanisms are simply one specialized type
of legal setting for the settlement of disputes. The setting is ana—
logous to a civil suit with the arbitrator acting as judge. Indeed,
each side's "case" is often presented to the arbitrator by the
parties' attorneys, and the arbitrator produces a written decision
after hearing the case. Negotiated settlements are entirely analogous
to "out of court" settlements in civil suits, and arbitrated cases are
the ones that •'go to trial." What is unusual about arbitration
systems is that the arbitrator's decisions, and sometimes the
proposals made by the parties, are both publicly obtainable and easily
reduced to a single numerical magnitude. Consequently, we suspect
that a great deal may be learned about the general nature of legal
decision—making by quantitative studies of the simpler arbitration
prototypes .
Second,the growing theoretIcal literature on the nature of
alternative arbitration mechanisms has raised a number of issues whose
resolution requires empirical inquiry. In conventional arbitration,
for example, the arbitrator fashions an award based on an analysis of
the relevant facts and the arbitrator's external judgment of what
would comprise a fair award. It has often been suggested that this
arbitration system generates little useful Information from the par-
ties, and causes the parties' settlement offers to diverge, because to
do otherwise might prejudice the arbitrator's judgment against the
parties' self interests. To remedy this potential difficulty, Carl—3—
Stevens suggested a system of final—offer arbitration nearly two
decades ago. Stevens suggested that in order to induce settlement
each party should be required to submit to the arbitrator a single
final offer, and the arbitrator would then be required to select one
or the other of those offers without compromise.2
In early theoretical work, Crawford observed that if the
arbitrator's (exogenously determined) notion of a fair settlement were
known to the two parties, then both arbitration mechanisms would
almost certainly lead to the same outcome in a zero—sum setting. In
conventional arbitration this would happen because whatever negotiated
settlement was proposed by one party, the other party would always
do better by holding out for the arbitrator's "fair" decision. Thus,
all outcomes would coincide with the arbitrator's preference either
through negotiation under the threat of arbitration or by arbitrator
decision. Assuming the arbitrator selects the final offer closest to
his notion of a fair settlement, this would also be the case wIth
final—offer arbitration. Again, whatever proposal was made by one
party, the other party could always do better by holding out for the
arbitrator's preferred outcome and both parties would inevitably be
led to agree on this outcome or see it imposed by the arbitrator. In
this scenario, the threat of arbitration effectively determines the
outcome of all settlements and, if the parties bear the arbitration
costs, the actual arbitration of cases would wither away.3 Although
this might appear to the outsider as the great success of the arbitra-
tion system in encouraging the parties to bargain on their own,—4—
precisely the contrary would be the case. The parties would merely be
agreeing to the outcome that is already a foregone conclusion and
saving themselves the cost of arbitration.
The key to Crawford's conclusion is, of course, the assumption
that both parties know with certainty the arbitrator's preferred out-
come. In a series of papers Farber, and Farber and Katz (1979, 1980),
have explored the case where the parties are uncertain as to the
arbitrator's preferences. In this setting the outcomes under conven-
tional and final—offer arbitration will generally differ. Negotiated
settlements and whether these will occur will then depend, in dif-
ferent ways under the two arbitration systems, on the parties' attitu-
des toward risk, their prior views on the distribution of arbitrator
preferences, and other variables.
Distinguishing whether it is more or less reasonable to assnme
that the parties are certain about arbitrator preferences is equiva-
lent to testing whether the arbitrator's decisions under a final—offer
statute are predictable once information on the final offers and the
environment of the bargaining unit is known. In this paper we put
these issues to an empirical test in an effort to discriminate between
the implications of these two theoretical setups. In order to do this
we set out simple models of arbitrator behavior under both final—offer
and conventional arbitration and provide a method for testing the
empirical implications of these models for observed arbitration
awards and for the "fairness" of arbitrator behavior.—5—
I. 1kdels of Arbitrator Behavior
The New Jersey Fire and Police Arbitration Act wasapproved in
May of 1977. The establishment of some kind of arbitration statute
followed almost inevitably from the passage in 1968 oflegislation
that granted New Jersey's public sector employees theright to orga-
nize and bargain collectively, but not the right to strike. Thedif-
ficulty was that In the absence of the right to strike negotiations
often went on long after annual municipal budget cycles had been
closed. The purpose of the arbitration statute was toensure that
contract negotiations were final by the time of the employer'sbudget
submission date.
To accomplish this purpose employees and employers coveredby
the Act (mainly police and fire department workers) mustbegin collec-
tive bargaining at least 120 days before the employer'sbudget sub-
mission date. If the parties do not reach anagreement by 60 days
prior to this date they may select the conventional arbitration mecha-
nism for settlement of the unresolved issues. If theparties cannot
or prefer not to agree to conventional arbitration they are thencom-
pelled to have the disputed issues resolved by final—offer arbitra-
tion, with the economic issues taken as a single package.
Arbitrators are assigned to cases by the New Jersey Public
Employment Relations Commission (PERC), which is responsible for admi-
nistration of the Act. A list of seven members from the PERC'sspe-
cial panel of arbitrators is first circulated to the parties for
comment. One of the seven Is then appointed to the case, with all—6—
arbitration fees borne jointly by the parties (subject to a fee sche-
dule approved by the PERC).
A. Arbitrator Behavior Under Final—Offer Arbitration
Under final—offer arbitration the arbitrator is required to
select either the union's final offer wU or the employer's final offer
as the settlement.5 In order to do this we supposethat the
arbitrator has in mind a preferred settlementa. The value of a is
presumably based on the application of subjective principlesof equity
to the objective considerations of a particularcase.6 The value of
in any particular arbitration case is, of course, unknown to out-
side observers. Moreover, in a case resolved by final—offer arbitra-
tion a will never be revealed.
The preferred settlements of arbitratorsa will presumably vary
across arbitration cases both because of unobservedvariations in eco—
nomic environments and because of differences in arbitrators'
assessments of those circumstances. We shall suppose that in a given
year a maybe thought of as being drawn from an as yet unspecified
distribution function. The simplest mechanism by which an arbitrator
in a particular case might select an offer is to choose that party's
offer that is closest to wa. In these circumstances the arbitrator
would select the employer's offer if
a e u a
(1)1w —w 1w —wI
and select the union's offer otherwise. Sincewe < wu or there would
be no need for arbitration, (1) implies that the employer'soffer is
selected if—7--
a e u (2) w(w +w)/2
Given the established values of the employer and union final offers,
(2) implies that the employer's offer will be chosen if an arbitrator
is selected for the case whose preferred settlement is less than the
simple average of e and wU. It follows that the probability of an
employer victory, P, is simply
(3) P =Proba (We + wU)/2]
=F[(we +
where F(s) indicates the value of the cumulative distribution function
that describes arbitrator preferences.7 If we take the distribution
of arbitrator preferences to be normal with meani and standard
deviation a, as we shall do in our empirical work, (3) is simply
(4) P =N[(We + wU)/2P —(P/yP)]
where N(s) indicates the value of the cumulative standard normal
distribution function. Expression (4) is nothing more than a simple
probit function, and its parameters are straightforward to estimate by
standard maximum likelihood methods. The constant in this probit
function is an estimate of ji/a, while the coefficient of (We + w)/2
is an estimate of l/a. It follows that although the various realized
values of a may not be observed, the parameters of the distribution
function from which the arbitrator's preferences are drawnmay be
estimated from a series of observations on union and employer final
offers and arbitrator choices from those offers.—8—
It is worth observing that the even—handed arbitrator treatment
of union and employer offers embedded in the decision rule (1) has
some immediate superficial plausibility, at least under the New Jersey
statute. After all, arbitrator fees are borne by the parties and the
parties' choices are taken into account in the selection of an
arbitrator from the panel of seven arbitrators initially proposed.
Since arbitrators derive considerable income from these fees the deci-
sion rule (1) may be the best viable strategy for maximizing an
arbitrator's income over any long—run period.8
A major objection to the even—handed arbitrator treatment
implied by (1) is that it rules out arbitrator bias as might be indi-
cated by the asymmetric treatment of union and employer final offers.
As it turns out, the presence of this form of arbitrator bias may be
tested for empirically. Suppose, for example, that the employer's
offer is accepted if
a e u a
(5) a tw —w< 1w —w
where a > 0. In this setup arbitrators demonstrate a pro—union, pro—
employer, or no bias as a > 1, a < 1, or a =1.With this specifica-
tion the probability that an employer's offer is accepted is
(6) P =N{ [ct/(1+ a)]qe+ [11(1 +a)i1wU—P/P}
Equation(6)does nothing more than free up the coefficients on
and wU in the probit function. The ratio of these coefficients is
an estimate of a, while their sum is an estimate of1/c. We shall
test the hypothesis a =1in the empirical work below.—9—
An alternative objection to the decision rule (1) is that It
implies that arbitrator notions of fairness do not explicitly take
account of the parties' final offers. It is not hard to see, however,
that so long as the arbitrator weighs the employer and union offers
symmetrically the decision rule (1) is observatlonally equivalent to
an entire class of rules where the arbitrator does take these offers
explicitly Into account. Suppose for example that the arbitrator's
preference a is formed as
-a a e u (7) w =yw+ (1 —y)(w + w )/2
with 0 < y < 1. Here 1a is a weighted average of a, the arbitrator's
preference in the absence of information on the offers, and the mid-
point of the final offers. The employer's offer is accepted if
—wel< twu —a1which will be the case if
-a a e u e u w =yw+ (1 —y)(w + w )/2 < (w ÷w)/2
or if
a e u (8) yw <y(w +w)/2
The condition (8) is, of course, identical to (1). From an empirical
point of view, therefore, there is an infinite set of symmetric
arbitrator decIsion—making processes that all lead to the same obser—
vationally equivalent decisions. In this sense the decision rule (1)
may be a very robust empirical device.—10—
Itis worth observing that the structure of the empirical
analysis varies slightly when arbitrators use decision rule (5) but
when arbitrator notions of fairness are formed according to equation
(7). In this case the probability that an employer's offer is
accepted is
eu pm (9) P =N{61w+62w —i/c
where 61 =[ct/(l+a) —(1_1)/2]/10P and 62 =[11(1+a)—
(1—y)/21/ya'.By comparison it is clear that equations (9) and (6)
are observationally equivalent and that a and y are not separately
identified in the latter formulation. Nevertheless, as with (6), the
sum of the coefficients of e and w in (9) is an estimate of
implying that is identified, and the equality of the coefficients
and 62 continues to provide a test of the hypothesis a =1.
The test of the hypothesis a =1is mainly a test of the deci-
sion rule (1) under the maintained hypothesis that the distribution
function characterizing the a may be taken to be normal. To this
point, however, we have not attempted to characterize this distribu-
tion in any more detail. For many observers, however, a test of the
fairness of arbitrators is really a test of whether is "fair," or
of whether arbitrators have the "correct" preferences. Of course, it
is difficult to specify the value for that would be fair, but it is
not difficult to make a function of some specified set of variables
whose coefficients can be estimated. For theth observation we
may write = toget the probit function
(6a)P1
=N{[a/(l+a) i]w+ [11(1+a) ci w -P,aP}—11—
This merely introduces the variablesx1 into the probit function. Our
estimates of the coefficients in the vector 8 p willindicate how the
variables in the vector x determine themean of the distribution of
the arbitrators' notions of what is fair. Theseestimates may, of
course, be compared by the outside observer againstany proposed def i—
nitlon of what should determine anaverage a "fair" award. Indeed,
the econometric analysis that followsmay be interpreted as nothing
more than a scheme for uncovering the nature of arbitratorpreferences
when only qualitative information on arbitratorawards is available.
We consider three main candidate variablesto enter the vector
x. First, it seems likely that a measure of the wage rate in some
alternative occupation may influence an arbitrator'sdecision. If the
relative supply of workers to police departmentswere very elastic
with respect to this alternativewage, the wage structure determined
in a competitive market would, ofcourse, guarantee one—to—one move-
ments in the wage rates of police workers and thewage rates in theIr
alternative occupations. For a variety ofreasons we doubt that the
relative supply of police workers is highly elasticin the short run,
but the hypothesis that arbitrators form theirnotions of a fair award
as if it were true has considerable intuitive appeal andseems worth
testing. Second, it also seems possible that arbitratorsmay act to
narrow (or occasionally widen) the wage differentials ofpolice
workers across municipal jurisdictions. To theextent that this
occurs we may expect that an arbitrator's notion ofa fair wage
increase will be negatively (or occasionallypositively) correlated—12—
with the level of the wage in the previous contractin that municipa-
lity. To test this hypothesis we includethe level of the previous
contract wage as an element of the vector x1. Finally,we consider
the impact of the municipality's financial well—being onthe
arbitrator's decision. We include in the vector x boththe
municipality's tax rate and its per capita debt,with the presumption
that greater values of both of these variables operateto reduce the
arbitrator's notion of a fair award. We conclude by observingthat,
as we have already noted, the New Jerseystatute directs arbitrators
to consider all of these items in framingtheir decisions, but without
stipulating how or in what form.It is an empirical question, there-
fore, as to whether any or all of thesevariables bear a stable rela-
tionship to arbitrator preferences.
B. Arbitrator Behavior Under ConventionalArbitration
Under conventional arbitration the arbitratoris free to fashion
a settlement of his own choosing.As before, we assume that
wa represents the arbitrator's preferred award in the absence of
information on the parties' proposed offers. Weconsider two alter-
native schemes by which the arbitrator may fashionand then impose a
settlement .
Thesimplest scheme would be for the arbitratorto simply impose
his preferred award wa as the settlement. Inthis case observations
on conventional arbitration awardswould directly reveal arbitrator
preferences. For theith arbitration case we would then have—13—
(10) w =r+
where has mean zero and standard deviation nr. If the mean of the
distribution of the arbitrator's preferred settlements varies with
some vector of variables whose coefficient vector is this would
lead to nothing more than the regression function
(11)
a=8r+
which is easily fit to the data on conventional arbitration awards.
Alternatively, it may be supposed that the arbitrator attempts
to fashion a compromise based on a and the arguments presented to him
by the parties. Suppose that the last offers presented by the parties
to each other are
e
and wU and that these are made known to the
arbitrator. A natural compromise arbitration award would then be
(12) =pw + (1 —p)(w +w)/2
=P(xF)+ (1—p)(w+ w)/2 +pc1
=P(x1t)+
where =(1—p)(w+w)/2+pci,and 0 < p < 1
The second line of (12) might also be fit directly as a
regression function to the data if e and w" were observed. In con-
ventional arbitration proceedings, however, these offers are not—14—
generally known to outside observers, and they may never be stated
explicitly by either party in any case. If the unobserved offers
and w" are correlated with the variables In the vectorx, as may
well be the case, our regression estimates of in (12) will suffer
from conventional omitted variable bias.
The question naturally arises as to how the models of conven-
tional arbitrator behavior in (11) and (12) might be distinguished
empirically. It should be clear that this will not generally be
possible without observations on e and w1 when all arbitrators are
assigned to conventional arbitration cases. In New Jersey, however,
the same panel of arbitrators is used in both conventional arbitration
and final—offer arbitration cases. It follows that for this group of
r pr p r p arbitrators we may assume p =p ,a=a,and =.Underthese
assumptions we may fit equations (6a) and (11) separately and use a
test for the equality of these parameters as evidence to favor one or
the other of the formulations of (11) or (12). If, for example, the
inverse of the standard deviation of conventionally arbitrated awards
Is equal to the slope of the probit function in (4) we have evidence
that arbitrators simply impose upon the parties their notion of a fair
award, as In (10).If, on the other hand, this equality Is not
satisfied in the data we may have evidence that the arbitrators take
some account of the unobserved offers of the parties, as in (12).b0—15—
II. Empirical Results
The likelihood function for the final—offer arbitration sample
is simply
(13) L =ie'i 1u (1 —
where is given by (6) [or (6a)] and the first product iei is
taken over employer victories and the second product ,r(1 —P)is
taken over union victories. The likelihood function for the conven-
tional arbitration sample is simply the likelihood for a conventional
regression,
(14) Lr(1/r)[a —r),ar]
where n(s) indicates the standard normal density function. So long as
the parameters and o (j =p,r)are taken to be different, (13)
and (14) may be maximized independently by the usual procedures. In
the case where ji== i)),or 8 =8r=8,and= = however,
the likelihood of the combined sample is
(15) L =L•Lr
and the parameters 1, 8, and a are comnn to all parts of the likeli-
hood function.11—16—
A. Basic Results
Sample statistics for the basic data are given in Table 1.
These data were collected directly from written arbitration reports.
In a few cases all the necessary data were not available in a given
report and the observation had to be deleted. Arbitration awards and
final offers are given throughout in the form of percentage increases
in total compensation.
The sample statistics in Table 1 reveal much of what the econo-
metric analysis will confirm. First, the mean of the union and
employer final offers is quite low when compared to the mean of the
conventionally arbitrated settlements. In 1979 and 1980 the mean of
the union offers is about equal to the mean of the conventionally
arbitrated settlements, while the mean of the employer offers is more
than two percentage points lower. Although not quite so extreme in
the data for 1978, this phenomenon shows up there also. If the mean
of the conventionally arbitrated cases is taken to indicate the mean
of the distribution of arbitrators' preferred settlements, this
suggests that the union groups were behaving very conservatively
indeed. Second, consistent with this presumption is the fact that in
all three years the union offers were accepted in roughly two—thirds
to three—quarters of the cases. The result was that actual awards
under conventional and final—offer arbitration were not nearly so far
apart as the parties' final offers might indicate. Finally, the pro-
portion of cases reaching arbitration dropped considerably between
1978 and 1980. This is consistent with the notion that the use of—17—
Table I
Means and Standard Deviations of Final Offers and
Conventional Arbitration Awards, Police Arbitration Cases,
New Jersey, 1978—1980
1980 1979 1978
Mean (and standard deviation) of 5.70 6.51 5.01
Employer Offers (100.w ) (2.57) (1.35) (1.44)
Mean (and standard deviation) of 8.54 8.29 7.14
Union Offers (100.w ) (1.46) (1.73) (1.12)
Mean (and standard deviation) of 8.10 7.57 6.63
Final—Offer Arbitration Awards (1.41) (1.48) (1.19)
Number of Final—Offer Arbitration 109 92 123
Cases
Proportion of Employer Victories .266 .348 .317
Mean (and standard deviation) of 8.26 8.59 6.55
Conventional Arbitration Awards (2.14) (2.32) (2,23)
Number of Conventional Arbitration 32 20 47
Cases
Proportion of Bargaining Cases .30 .34 .49
Going to Arbitration
Source: Authors' tabulation of arbitrator reports.—18—
arbitration will decline considerably as more is learned by the par-
ties about arbitrator preferences. Between the first and second years
of the statute's operation in New Jersey the percentage of nego-
tiations that ended up in arbitration declined from nearly 49 percent
to 34 percent. The drop in the utilization of arbitration from the
second to the third year of the statute'.s life was far less dramatic,
and it Is our casual impression that further declines have been
smaller still. This suggests, although the data are not yet available
to confirm it, that at least one—quarter of negotiations may continue
to end in arbitration even after the parties are thoroughly familiar
with the statute's operation.
Table 2 contains the empirical results obtained by maximizing
various versions of the likelihood functions (13) —(15)when the
variables x are ignored. These results are perhaps the easiest to
interpret and they display much of what the data contain. Incolumn
(a) we present the simplest results for each year that correspond to
the probit function (4) and the regression equation (10). In these
results we impose the constraint a =1.0.Consider first the results
for 1980. The mean of arbitrator preferences from the final—offer
arbitration cases (1jP) is estimated at 8.3 percent, which is con-
siderably higher than the mean of the final offers of the employer
groups and only slightly lower than the meanof the final offers of
the union groups indicated In Table 1. The standard deviation of
arbitrator preferences from the final—offer arbitration cases(yP) is































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































strong positive correlation in the data between the final offers and
the incidence of employer victories. The remarkable result in column
(a), however, is the extraordinarily close match between the indepen-
dent estimates of the mean and standard deviation of arbitrator pre-
ferences from the conventional and final—offer arbitration cases.
This indicates that the coefficient of (We + w5/2 in the probit func—
tion(4) is nearly identical to the reciprocal of the standard
deviation of the regression errors in equation (10). As Table 1 indi-
cates, precisely the same result holds in the 1978 and 1979 data.
Although not conclusive, this strongly suggests that the settlements
in the conventionally arbitrated cases mainly reveal the underlying
distribution of arbitrator preferences. The results in the columns
labeled (b) are obtained by maximizing the likelihood function (15) in
order to test the joint hypothesis 11r pP and =a.As expected,
a likelihood ratio test indicates that this hypothesis cannot be
rejected in any of the years 1978, 1979, or 1980.
There is another simple way to state these empirical results.
Suppose that we take the mean and standard deviation of the conven-
tional arbitration awards as measures of the mean and standard
deviation of arbitrators' preferences (Wa). These assumptions imply
that we may predict the actual fraction of employer victories
from: knowledge of the final offers. Table 2 confirms that these
predictions are essentially identical to the maximum likelihood
predictions based on the final—offer data alone. Likewise, these same
assumptions imply that the correlation between the simple average of—21—
the union and employer final offers, (We + w5/2, and the incidence of
employer victories may be predicted from the mean and standard
deviation of the conventional arbitration awards alone. We also find
this to be the case from the results in Table 2.
In the columns labeled (c) in Table 2 we continue to maintain
the hypothesis lIp = and =rand test the hypothesis a =1.0.
In 1980 the estimate of a is well above unity, while in 1979 the esti-
mate of a is slightly below unity, but in no case can we reject the
hypothesis a =1.0.In the columns labelled (d) we no longer maintain
the hypotheses = and = andagain test the hypothesis
a =1.0.Again for 1979 and 1980 we can find no evidence for rejec-
tion of this hypothesis. This suggests that the unbiased decision
rule (1) provides a satisfactory fit to the data, at least for 1979
and 1980. The exception is for 1978, where the hypothesis a =1.0may
be rejected at any conventional test level. What this finding
represents in the data may be stated In a different way. In par-
ticular, the results in column (d) of Table 2 for 1978, for example,
imply a coefficient (and standard error) for e in the probit equation
(6) of .59 (.07). The estimated coefficient (and standard error) on
in equation (6a) is —.15 (.04), however. These results indicate
that the incidence of employer victories was positively correlated
with the size of employer final offers in the 1978 data, as expected,
but that the incidence of employer victories was negatively correlated
with the size of union final offers, which was not expected. In view
of the results for 1979 and 1980 we are inclined to attribute the poor—22—
performance of the simple arbitrator rule (1)in1978 to the con-
siderable confusion surrounding the initial implementation of the New
Jersey statute.12 Why and how this would have produced the anomalous
empirical results in Table 2 is an issue that requires further
research.
B. Further Results
Table 3 contains unrestricted estimates of the parameters and
under various specifications for the variables in the vector x1.
Definitions and descriptive statistics for these variables are con-
tained in Table 4. Also listed in each column are the values for the
maximized logarithmic likelihood under the constraints =rand the
maximized logarithmic likelihood under the further constraint that
a =1.0.13Testing the hypothesis a 1.0 withoutmaintaining
=rmay be accomplished by using a straightforward normal
statistic computed from the estimate of a and its estimated standard
error in Table 3.
The rationale for including the variables SAL,TAXandDEBT in
the analysis has already been established, but the inclusion of PCI,
the percentage change in county income per capita, requires some
explanation.As our earlier discussion suggested, we wouldlike to
have measured thepercentagechange in some alternative wage rate in
the municipality to include inthevector of variables x.At the
levelof the municipality to which these data refer, however, the best
measure of thisquantitythat we could obtain was the percentage






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Definitions,Means, and Standard Deviations
of the Control Variables Used to Compute
the Results in Table 3
1980 1979 1978
Variable Definition F0A' CA11 FOA CA FOA CA
PCI1 Lagged percent 12.49 12.4410.75 10.987.49 7.30
change in county (1.57) (2.96)(.77) (1.26) (.79) (1.93)
income per capita
SAL1 Salary level in 18136 17905 17091 1560816227 16278
previous year (2248) (2095)(2529) (1622) (1966) (2292)
(in dollars)
TAX_1Municipality's state2.58 2.63 2.903.113.07 4.11





DEBT1 Net debt per capita 209 250 161 161 190 216
in municipality in (143) (174)(101) (170)(127) (163)
previous year
(in dollars)
(1) FOA indicates final—offer arbitration cases.
(ii) CA indicates conventional arbitration cases.—26—
a part. The use of this variable no doubt entails some measurement
error and may result in downward biased estimates of the effect of
this variable. A useful future research project would be to remedy
this measurement defect, if this is possible.
As Table 3 indicates, the alternative wage variable (LPCI) has a
statistically significant and positive effect on the mean of arbitra-
tor preferences in the data for 1979 and 1980 for both the final—offer
and conventional arbitration cases. In 1979 the alternative wage
coefficient is near to unity for both types of cases, as we had specu-
lated might be the case. In 1980, however, this coefficient is signi-
ficantly less than unity, and in 1978 it is often negative and
occasionally statistically significant. Taken together these results
provide some support for the hypothesized importance of alternative
wages in the determination of arbitrator preferences, althoughthe
results are far from conclusive.
In 1978 and 1980 the level of the previous contract salary has a
negative effect on arbitrator preferences that is generallystatisti-
cally significant. This suggests that in these years arbitrators
tended to behave as if they wished to narrow the salary differences
across municipalities. In 1979, however, the previous contract salary
tends to have a positive effect on arbitrator preferences that is
often statistically significant. Taken at face value these results
suggest that the arbitrator's perceived role in narrowing(or
widening) inter—municipality salary differences may be unstablefrom
year to year.—27—
Finally, in 1978 and 1979 greater levels of taxation and per
capita municipal debt have an unambigously negative and statistically
significant effect on arbitrator awards. In 1980 these results are no
longer unambiguous; indeed, the (unreported) estimates that constrain
=generallyshow no statistically significant effect of per
capita debt or taxation on arbitrator awards. These results suggest
that the arbitrator's perceived role in responding to municipal taxa-
tion or debt burdens is by no means stable from year toyear.
In sum, we have found statistically significant, but temporarily
unstable effects of alternative wage rates, prior contractwage rates,
and per capita debt and taxation variables on arbitrator awards.
There are two alternative explanations for these results, but it will
take additional research to sort out their empirical validity. First,
it may simply be the case that the main predictable variability in the
central tendency of arbitrator awards is in their movements through
time. If this is the case, then our time—series of estimates of
=pP11r and a == arfor each year should ultimately provide
the data for a more complete explanation of the basic variability in
arbitrator preferences. Considerably more experience with the
New Jersey statute will be necessary before there is enough data to
make this feasible. Moreover, if this is the explanation for our
findings, then most of the parameter estimates in Table 3 do not
reveal much, if anything, about the more fundamental determinants of
arbitrator decision—making. Indeed, in casual conversations we have
found that much arbitrator behavior is characterized as "following the—28—
herd,' or "looking up and down the street," and the results in Table 3
may simply be a description of this behavior rather than an explana—
tion of it.
An alternative explanation is that there are stable rela-
tionships between arbitrator preferences and some set of variables xi,
but that in our analysis important variables have been omitted from
x. Only data from a better experimentthan we have available can
confirm or refute this possibility.
The remaining results in Table 3 confirm the major findings in
Table 2. In 1979 and 1980 the hypothesis a =1.0is clearly
accepted by the data, although for 1978 It clearly is rejected. On
the other hand, the joint constraints = and =areocca-
sionally rejected in the various specifications for x that are tested
in Table 3. We are inclined to attribute this to the very small
samples (especially for conventional arbitration) available for esti-
mating the fully unconstrained models. No doubt larger samples and a
more detailed set of variables for the vector x would increase the
power and confidence with which these hypotheses can be tested.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the addition of the
variables x1 to the analysis reduces the estimated unpredictable
variability in arbitrator preferences (a). Nevertheless, considerable
unpredictable variability remains in all cases. In view of the
importance of this issue we have also pursued It by an attempt to
account for the individual influence of specific arbitrators. To do
this we have estimated equation (4) with separate intercepts for each—29—
arbitrator. In the probit model these fixed effects are econometri-
cally identified only if an individual arbitrator selected at least
one employer offer and one union offer in a given year. Table 5 lists
the number of final—offer arbitration cases that satisfy this cri-
terion. There are simply too few conventional arbitration cases to
perform the analysis for that group. Depending on the year, the table
indicates that nearly one—half of the final—offer arbitration cases
are decided by four to seven arbitrators who selected at least one
union and one employer final offer.
The results in Table 5 indicate that the introduction of the
arbitrator dummies considerably reduces the estimate of the unpredic-
table variability ()inarbitrator preferences in 1980 and 1978.
Nevertheless, cl never falls below one percent and is sometimes as
high as three percent. This strongly suggests that successful models
of the strategic behavior of the parties will almost certainly have to
account explicitly for the uncertainty the parties face in arbitrator
decision—making.
III. Conclusion
The empirical models of arbitrator behavior in this paper are an
important first step in the much needed empirical studies of arbitra-
tion outcomes that remain on the agenda for further research. More
complete models should explain both the determination of the parties'
final offers, whether they choose to engage in conventional or final—
offer arbitration, and whether they choose to negotiate a settlement—30—
Table 5
Estimates of in Equation (4) with cs. =1and
with (and without) Arbitrator Dummies,
(i)
Police Arbitration Cases, New Jersey, 1978—1980
1980 1979 1978
p 4.885 2.870 3.185 3.156 2.272 1.114
(3.153) (1.607) (1.532) (1.514) (.821) (.294)
Log Likelihood —34.89—28.89 —21.82—20.93 —36.89—30.04
Arbitrator Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Included (——) (3) (——) (3) (——) (6)
(No. included)
No. of FOA 531) 53(ii) 39 65 65
Observations
(i) Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below
parameter estimates.
(ii) These data include several arbitration cases involving county police.—31—
without arbitration. The simple models of arbitrator behavior
presented and estimated with remarkable success here will presumably
be a key ingredient to this further research.
We have two important substantive empirical results to report.
First, under the New Jersey statute union offers have been selected
most of the time in final—offer arbitration cases.1 This finding has
raised immediate questions about the impartiality and integrity of the
arbitrators in some quarters. In general, we should expect a fair
arbitrator to be one that considered the objective considerations in a
particular case and then settled on what, in the arbitrator's own
mind, seemed a preferred settlement. Given the arbitrator's preferred
award, it seems clear that a fair arbitrator must select whichever
final offer is closest to it. Supposing that the union and employer
also understand this process, they will use their best estimates of
the arbitrator's preference to shape their own offers with the
understanding that a higher offer by either party will increase the
probability that the employer's offer will be selected. If the
parties behave symmetrically, as most of us might have expected, we
would expect the union and employer offers to fall equally distant
from, but on opposite sides of, the parties' best estimate of the
arbitrator's preferred award. In this scenario we should naturally
expect the union offers to be selected in one—half of the cases. It
is this prediction that isstrongiy:contradicted by the facts.
It follows that thereare two. different resons:why unIon offers
may be disproportionately accepted by the arbitrators. On the one—32—
hand,arbitrators may not follow the decision processset out above.
If this is the case, the integrity of thearbitration system is being
seriously undermined. On the other hand,the parties may not typi-
cally position themselves equally distantfrom, and on opposite sides
of, the arbitrator's preferredaward. This might happen either
because unions have a more conservativeview of what arbitrators will
allow or because unions may be more fearfulof taking the risk of loss
thanare employers.
Our econometric results provide strong evidence,however, that
the final—offer arbitration decisions were generatedby a set of
impartial arbitrators who were systematicallyapplying the same
standards used in conventional arbitration cases.The evidence for
this is that (a) the proportion of unionvictories and (b) the
correlation between the incidence of unionvictories and the mean of
the union and employer final offers are preciselythose predicted from
the data on conventional arbitration casesalone. (These are econo-
metric tests of standard cross—equationrestrictions.) These results
indicate that arbitrators treat generous employeroffers no dif-
ferently than they treat conservativeunion offers. Instead, the
union offers are most often selected becausethe frequency of
conservative union offers is considerably greaterthan the frequency
of generous employer offers. it followsthat any critique of the
generosity of the final—offerarbitration awards must be based on
something other than simple win—lossrecords.—33—
Our second important empirical result Is that this conservative
union behavior resulted in lower average wage increases under the
final—offer arbitration provisions than under the conventional
arbitration provisions of the New Jersey statute. Although the union
offers are accepted in a vast majority of the final—offer arbitration
cases, and so the unions appear to "win' In final—offer arbitration,
the actual wage increases in these cases are lower than in the conven-
tional arbitration cases. At the same time, we find considerably less
variability In the actual awards under the final—offer arbitration
provisions than under the conventional arbitration provisions of the
statute. What the union bargainers gave up, therefore, by way of a
decrease in the mean award under final—offer arbitration they may have
made up by a reduction in its variability. This suggests that union
bargainers may be considerably more risk averse than employer
bargainers and opens up some interesting possibilities for additional
research.
The serious quantitative study of dispute settlement mechanisms
has only just begun. Further empirical and theoretical research on
the operation of these mechanisms may therefore have an important
impact on their future design.—34—
Footnotes
*PrincetonUniversity and Harvard University, respectively. We are
grateful for useful discussiors of the material in this paper with
Christopher Cavanagh, Henry Farber, Richard Lester, Daniel
McFadden, and Jeffrey Tener, and from comments by Vincent Crawford
and John Pencavel on an early draft. Daniel Rosenblum provided
expert computational assistance. Bloom's research was supported,
in part, by a grant from the Ford Motor company to Carnegie—Mellon
University, where Bloom was on the faculty of the school of Urban
and Public Affairs.
1. For a similar view see especially Landes and Posner's wide ranging
discussion of private adjudication systems, and the early paper by
Gould.
2. Stevens' remarkable paper raises most of the important issues
relevant to the analysis of this arbitration scheme. The use of
his system is growing and has already been adopted for the settle-
ment of certain public sector labor disputes in six U.S. states
and in Chile and has also been used in settling disputes in major
league baseball. James Meade, a prominent member of Britain's new
Social Democratic Party, has suggested its use in Great Britain as
the enforcement mechanism for a new wage and price monitoring
Systern.
3. See Bloom (1981) for a more complete analysis of the role of
arbitration costs.—35—
4. We analyze only disputes in police work in thispaper, as many of
New Jersey's fire department are volunteercompanies. Other
details of the statute are discussed by Bloom(1980).
5. Under the New Jersey statute those issues thatmay be reduced to a
single numerical award are the "economic" issues, and it is these
that we examine throughout. "Noneconomic" issuesare handled as a
separate item under the New Jersey statute, and their analysis
raises some difficult issues. In fact, however,most disputes
involving police officers in New Jersey have been overpay, so
that our focus on economic issues isprobably the appropriate one
there.
6. In New Jersey, arbitrators are directed togive due weight to an
enormously broad variety of factors that includes (1) the
interests of the public, (2) relevant comparisons ofwages and
working conditions, (3) the overall level ofcompensation already
received, (4) the f1nancal impact of the settlementon the
municipality, (5)thecost of living, and (6) the continuity of
employment. Considerable discretion is obviously leftto indivi-
dual arbitrators.
7. Although his interpretation isdifferent, equation (3) is iden-
tical to Farber's (1980) formulation ofa similar problem. Our
procedure was to some extent inspired by his.
8. This view of the arbitrator is alsosuggested by Davis. As this
discussion indicates, however, the incentivestructure for
arbitrators is an issue that deserves furtherresearch. Card has— 36--
begun it in his study of grievance arbitration.
9. Both of these are possibilities suggested by Farber (1981).
10. There is one disturbing case where this test maygivemisleading
results. Suppose that (12) is the correct structure for arbitra—
tor preferences, but that the estimates of (11) are biased bythe
omission of the variables (We w)/2 so as to cause acceptance of
the cross—equation constraints. Although this seems unlikely, the
positive correlation that presumably exists between and
(We + w')f2 will tend to counteract the attenuating effect of p on
the parameters estimated (since 0 < p < 1).
11. The likelihood function (15) is identical to that used by
Ashenfelter for an altogether different purpose, and its maximiza-
tion was carried out by similar methods.
12. We initially advanced this explanation for the anomalous findings
for 1978 in an earlier draft of this paper that contained data for
1978 and 1979 only. Ourfindingsfrom the 1980 data obviously
reinforced the strength of our belief in this explanation, but
only additional data can confirm it. There Was considerable
(perhaps unnecessary) confusion at the outset of the implemen-
tation of the New Jersey statute because of an ambiguity in the
CAPlawthen in effect. This law sets a limit on the growth of
municipal expenditures and there was initial uncertainty regarding
whether this was to be applied uniformly to each budget item,
including police salaries. Employers argued that the CAPlawdid
apply to each budget item and that arbitrators were bound by it—37--
also. Subsequent court decisions made it clear that this was not
the case.
13. The fitted coefficient8 for the constrained results are not
reported to conserve space, but they are available from the
authors in the form of a photocopied appendix.
14. This phenomenon is not restricted to New Jersey, however. There
is evidence of similar behavior in Michigan and Massachusetts,as
noted by Ashenfelter and Bloom.—38—
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